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1 Introduction
Anyone who has followed the conflict resolution
literature over the past forty to fifty years cannot
help but notice that certain themes wax and wane.
The constellation of ideas that have emerged as part
of the contemporary burgeoning conflict resolution
industry has a history In the late 1950s intellectual
trends developed in reaction to equilibrium
theorists who romanticised consensual and
harmonious models or who saw a silver lining in
every conflict. There were two opposing schools of
thought. In British anthropology the Manchester
school led by Max Gluckman (1959) represented
the idea that social conflict was functional for the
maintenance of social systems. In the United States
anthropologists Bernard Siegal and Alan Beals
(1960) saw conflict as dysfunctional phenomena,
produced by strains and stresses in the social
system, by internal and external pressures. In an
early review of the literature (LeVine 1961) the
sources of conflict as well as patterns of conflict
control and resolution were conceptualised in
terms of broad-gauged understandings of social
organisation, religion, economic interdependence,
and political structures. Article titles in that special
issue are grounded: 'Land shortage, social change,
and social conflict in East Africa', 'Feuding and
social change in Morocco', 'Extension of conflict as
a method of conflict resolution among the Suku of
the Congo'. The approach was holistic and not
geared to mechanical recipes for dispute
resolution.
In 1968 Ralf Dahrendorf extended the earlier work
arguing that social conflict is a creative force. In his
words: 'Not the presence but the absence of conflict
is surprising and abnormal ... we must never lose
sight of the underlying assumption that conflict
can be temporarily suppressed, regulated,
channeled, and controlled, but that neither a
philosopher-king nor a modern dictator can
abolish it once and for all' (Dahrendorf 1968:127).
Nevertheless, by the 1970s the dialogue over
conflict was shifting once again. In the United
States public policy was led by the Chief Justice of
the US Supreme Court, Warren Burger. The
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) explosion
burst onto the scene and was institutionalised
(Nader 1989). Conflict, as epitomised by the
adversarial system, was now portrayed as
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uncivilised, lawyers were pictured as hired guns,
peace not conflict was the goal, harmony not
contentious behaviour was extolled. ADR, a
response to containing the rights movements of the
1960s, was (among other things) a movement
institutionalised at the national level and then
exported. By the 1990s, ADR had become a major
industry composed of professionals from a wide
variety of fields: law, economics, psycholog)
political science, peace and conflict, therapy groups
and religious movements. In spite of early success,
the movement was always more attractive to
professionals than to its potential consumers, who
here and abroad remain generally sceptical about
the philosophy and purpose of ADR. By 1996 those
interested in alternative conflict resolution had
bifurcated into scholars and practitioners, with the
latter being in the greatest number.
In Africanist scholarship the trends have followed
in much the same direction. The ethnographic and
social anthropological schools of structural
functionalism contributed an enormous body of
scholarship about traditional African societies. For
many anthropologists, traditionalism was good or
functional and modernism (Westernisation) was
disruptive. Today some refer to the work of the
colonial period as having been written in the 'noble
savage' tradition, noting that anthropologists in
their protectionist attitudes had sought to preserve
African cultures, which ipso facto commits them to
preserving the status quo. Although there were
exceptions, the structural functionalist orientation
laid emphasis on equilibrium, integration, harmony
and consensus. African societies were, however,
often neither integrated nor harmonious, either in
the precolonial days (where they were often
embroiled in militaiy conquests), or in the colonial
period, which was characterised by economic,
political, and racial conflicts.
Anthropologists often portrayed the peoples they
studied as if they were culturally homogenous,
speaking about peoples without adequate attention
to the wide degree of structural variation and
cultural pluralism. That is, they essentialïsed. Still,
anthropologists were also among the first to criticise
their early work, and often in the lead with
correctives. One response to this (self) criticism was
the abandonment of the view of society as
harmonious and its replacement by a model that
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emphasised conflict and dissension in all its
complexity and dynamism: new nations, new
classes, changing roles for men, women and
children, religious transformation, and the
transformation of kinship and marriage,
nationalism and transnationalism.
The recognition that Africa was undergoing
profound and rapid changes, which included
indigenous and foreign elements, led to historical
ethnography that examined conflicts of interests
and values as they have shifted from place to place
due to the spread of Islam, of Christianity, due to
the result of European conquest, legal transplants
and multinational interests. The impact of
colonialism was still being felt in the independence
and post-independence periods as well as in
expressions of pan-Africanism.
With these historical highlights in mind the present
interdisciplinary scholarship can be seen to be of a
more partial sort. Ethnographically rich descript-
ions of conflict resolution in situ have given way to
description of conflict resolution techniques, work
that comes closer to a shreds-and-patches style of
reporting. Today, the bias of scholarship is
narrower, more practical, and more specialised. In
addition, interdisciplinary searches for recipes for
peace stem from political considerations that are
bipartisan, nationalist, pan-African, religious or
internationalist.
If colonialism was basically ignored as part of the
anthropological work a half century ago, today neo-
colonialism and globalisation are also inadequately
incorporated in Africanist scholarship on conflict
resolution even though development is sometimes
linked with alternative dispute resolution. But the
reflexivity that developed as a result of the self-
critiques of the sixties and earlier also means that
now we can use our critical sense to examine
scholarship, ours and others, Euroamerican and
African, with attention to such mundane questions
as whose funding, whose questions, whose benefits.
We can also question whether disciplinary concepts
have contributed to 'ethnographic error' and
inadequate scholarship.
In what follows I talk about what mostly is not
talked about in relation to dispute resolution in
Africa: the problem with terms like 'traditional' and
'modern', the problem with thinking about dispute
resolution in terms of mechanisms or techniques
that are specialities, the ingenuousness of speaking
about conflict resolution without speaking to and
about power, without speaking about arms dealing,
its source and its distribution,1 without speaking
about multinationals and resource competition - to
at least round out the picture of 'internal'
dissensions in Africa that are thinly portrayed on
the media's front burner.
There is a tendency to write and speak about
conflict resolution without mention of root causes,
or to contrast customary with state law without
adequate mention of European implants, without
thought to the consequences of short-term
objectives versus long-term solutions to problems.
Underlying much of this writing has been an
avoidance of the hegemonies that ride on law or
alternative dispute techniques, in order to
introduce yet another reason for future conflicts.
There is also avoidance of the ideological basis of
conflict management paradigms.
2 Tradition and Power
The symbolic uses of tradition for purposes of
legitimisation have been widely discussed. Peter
Worsley in The Three Worlds: Culture and World
Development summed it up:
Culture traits are not absolutes or simply
intellectual categories ... They are strategies or
weapons in competition over scarce social
goods. What is mistakenly often seen as
tradition - attachment to the past as a value in
itself - is better viewed as a way of maintaining
title to power, wealth and status in the present,
or as a nostalgic spiritual contrast to present
disprivilege. (1984:249)
Thinking about tradition and power in the African
context is tricky Some years ago, Martin Chanock
(1985) documented what some had articulated
before him, the European source of what anthrop-
ologists had been calling customary law. Chanock
drew attention to the role of Christian missionaries
in the establishment of local courts, a blend of
English procedural law and Christian rules of
behaviour drawn from Biblical scriptures. Thus,
alongside political colonialism, European
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Christianity spread the harmony legal model in a
manner that resembles the modern ADR movement
- with its emphasis on compromise and consensus
as a preferred way of decision making, peace over
justice being a mandatory result (Nader 1990).
Missionary purpose was twofold: to address the
'civilising mission' by teaching the 'savages' about
peaceful resolution of conflict through law courts,
and by teaching them the rules of a good Christian
life, which among other things excluded polygyny
and included the turning of the other cheek -
acquiescence, or the opposite of militancy,
something which probably suited the colonial
powers.
Today 'tradition' is up for grabs by any person or
group interested in garnering power. In the Native
American context federal officials and native
advocates actively use linguistic, ethical, moral, and
cultural and political traditions to sell nuclear waste
disposal to Native Americans by means of ADR (Ou
1996). In Africa and elsewhere traditional symbols
and institutions are regularly used by politicians to
reach both rural and urban populations. If
politicians can manipulate tradition or reinvent
tradition, so might strategists in conflict manage-
ment. A central dilemma revolves around the
observation that experts look for standardised
solutions while traditional conflict resolution is
particularistic or situational.
In a recent note 'Are Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR) programmes suitable for Africa?'
anthropologist Laurel Rose (1996) addresses some
of the conceptual problems of reinvented tradition
by comparing contemporary American ADR with
conflict resolution in African communities. She
points out that modern mediators are formally
trained, are strangers to the disputants, are
expected to be neutral, are private, formal, and
structured. African communities use mediators
with informal training through 'life experience', are
insiders and known to the disputants, not expected
to be neutral, operate collectively within a council
of elders in a public setting. While the American
ADR specialists operate with a limited range of
relevancy, the African process is characterised by a
wide range of relevancy, with full communication
and public disclosure. Consensus between the
parties is not what is sought, rather they want an
outcome which satisfies the community, usually
placing community interests before the disputants'
personal interests.
Under the auspices of the US AID programme, Rose
visited post-war Rwanda in 1994 to conduct
research into the local justice system (customary
institutions known as the gacaca) as preparation for
a larger ADR research team. The long-term goal was
a programme aimed at a Rwandan ADR initiative to
train mediators in the (temporary) absence of
courts. Rose found that the gacaca survived the war,
that people were seldom without operational
gacaca, and that they adapted to circumstances of
refugee camps or other temporary or permanent
circumstances. Rose also noted that the gacaca took
on wider functions beyond dispute resolution such
as the resettlement of large numbers of displaced
persons. Those gacaca implicated in war-related
events suffered a loss of legitimacy; nevertheless
Rose makes the point that Rwanda's 'customary
institution' had risen to the challenge of their war-
ravaged country and an ADR initiative, even should
they make use of traditional institutions like the
gacaca, would serve to weaken local self-
management or customary law.
Rose is referring to the cultural baggage that travels
with American ADR, even when or especially when
it is tied to a restructuring of indigenous systems.
Tradition and power is what she is addressing, and
an ADR American style that has much the flavour of
earlier missionising efforts of religious evangelising.
The other side of the coin appears when local
peoples desire to keep control by means of
customary proceedings in the light of external
powers against whom they may be complaining.
This is a condition where strong national law with
international appeal capacities cannot be substituted
for by localised forums such as the ADR.
3 The Power Dimension
If there is any single generalisation that has ensued
from the anthropological research on disputing
processes (Nader and Todd 1978) it is that
mediation and negotiation require conditions of
relatively equal power. In other words, negotiation
and mediation cannot be used for all disputes and
all conflicts. The adversary model deals with
uneven playing fields, made even by each party
having an advocate in a court of law. In real life
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things are not so neat. In Africa and elsewhere we
may have courts where mediation predominates or
at least where a third party can judge whether to
mediate, negotiate, or adjudicate a case.
In Euroamerican societies, harmony law models
have been valonsed recently over adversary models;
the opposite was true earlier. But history is clear on
one point. During the heyday of European
colonialism, courts were valorised over moots, and
the colonised were reminded regularly that the rule
of law was a most important sign of civilised society,
its presence indicating the right to participate in the
international law of nations. The presence of courts
was a sign of development and social complexity
The World Court was a standard of civilised
behaviour. Yet, in the latter part of the twentieth
century, harmony legal models are now thought to
be more civilised than courts. Now that the
'primitives' have courts, ADR or international
negotiations are valued as more civilised'. Now the
'civilised' first wonders who wish to go to court are
'barbarians', and 'primitives' and the natives are
considered the model of what it is to be truly
human (Nader 1994).
In a piece called 'Dispute Resolution Notes from the
Kalahari', anthropologist William L. Ury (1990)
declares that the Bushman of the Kalahari 'may have
been more peaceful than we who call ourselves
"civilised". In a concluding comment he articulates
an imaginary purity devoid of the power
dimension:
The Bushman of the Kalahari are a truly
interdependent society: they are socialised from
birth to be acutely aware of and sensitive to one
another needs ... In these peopl&s lives - and
presumably in our ancestors' lives as well -
cooperation more than competition becomes
the order of the day In our modern economies,
based as they are on competition among
individuals and groups, it is easy to see the
human adventure as a struggle for survival in
which you must win at all costs at the expense
of others. Our way of life is a few centuries old;
the Bushman has lasted tens of millennia. Life
may in fact be about the 'survival of the fittest',
but what makes people truly 'fit', as the
Bushmen remind us, is their ability to cooperate
and to settle disruptive disputes.
As if to prove the illusory nature of such a biased
picture, the board of anthropological advisors to
Odyssey South African documentary Nisa in the
late 1970s resigned after viewing the film because it
included shots of not so peaceful Bushmen who did
not fit the idyllic picture portrayed by Ury and
other anthropologists.
The most serious illusions and delusions about
conflict management are evident when we examine
the history of what really happens when disputes
are mediated or negotiated. In an article on
'Civilisation and its Negotiators' (1994) I trace the
history of international dispute resolution from the
World Court to International Negotiating Teams in
the settlement of international river disputes. Lon
Fuller argued that disputes that can be reasoned
through logical argument are appropriately
adjudicated (Fuller 1978:368-69), yet only a few
international water disputes have been settled by
adjudication. Before Fuller's article appeared, two
international law specialists argued his same point
specifically in reference to international river
disputes (Laylin and Bianchi 1959) - that without
the possibility of third-party decision makers, the
more powerful disputant can use ADR negotiation
to greater advantage.
A review of the role of adjudication and negotiation
in international river disputes (the Ganges, Jordan,
Colorado, Duoro, and Danube rivers) characterised
by power asymmetry and upstreamdownstream
issues reveals preference by the less powerful
nations for World Court adjudication while the
more powerful countries prefer negotiation (Nader
1994). It is reasonable in this light to understand
why, for powerful parties, negotiation and ADR are
preferred over the International Court of Justice.
The US joined the Court in 1946 after congressional
debates over whether national sovereignty would be
threatened. Since 1946 there have been changes in
the Court's composition and in the types of cases it
considers. In 1946 two-thirds of the judges were
either Americans or West Europeans. With the
addition of over one hundred states, many of them
'third world' states, judges reflect changed
composition; newer judges may be sympathetic to
the causes of the newer nations. Indeed, this change
was reflected in a number of decisions which ruled
in favour of third world nation plaintiffs such as in
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the case of Nicaragua against the US in 1984. In
1985, the Reagan administration withdrew the US
1946 agreement to voluntarily comply with the
jurisdiction of the World Court. As I put it: 'The
Soviet Union in the mid-i 960s and the US in the
mid-980s ... both withheld dues, thereby
abdicating their financial responsibility and
evincing a mood of indifference to international
law' (Nader 1994: 44). There has been a gradual
divergence between the Court's decisions and the
national interests of the developed countries.
Interestingly, the trivialisation of international
adjudication came at the height of the ADR
explosion in the US and national attacks on
domestic adjudication.
We need to think about some of these things before
recommending policies, national or otherwise, for
the peoples of Africa or elsewhere. If ADR is born of
a contempt for law and if the International Court is
replaced by international negotiation, and if the
justification is efficiency or stability, what hope is
there for the justice issues that arise at the base?
Take, for example, the case of famine (Lappe and
Atkins 1978; Schusky and Abbott n.d.). One of the
shocking facts that came to light in the research on
the Sahel famine was the extent of food exports
from the Sahel. In the peak period of drought and
famine, peanuts, cotton, vegetables and meat were
being exported. Sixty per cent of the food exports
went to Europe and the United States. Food
corporations made vast profits in the height of
famine. California-based agribusiness (the world's
largest iceberg lettuce growers) had in 1972
established subsidiaries in Senegal. The Senegalese
Government supplied police to clear away villagers
who presumed the land was theirs to grow millet
and other needed food. All the alternative dispute
mechanisms in the world will not replace the rule of
law in such a situation.
Nor can dispute resolution replace the rule of law in
a country like Mozambique, which in 1992 agreed
to a settlement that put an end to war. But peace did
not bring prosperity; it brought poverty, which
some say was caused by IMF-imposed stabilisation
policies (Hanlon 1996). Some Mozambicans call
this economic colonialism, different from earlier
colonialism because it does not have a face. In face-
to-faceless conflict the indigenous paradigm of face-
to-face dispute resolution has no place. On the
contrary, 'In trade negotiations, dispute resolution
proceedings are conducted in complete secrecy
with all documents unavailable to the public except
through leaks to the press' (French 1993).
One last aspect of power dimensions in Africa has
to do with military power, which is not commonly
reported in academic writings on conflict
management. The topic was highlighted in an issue
of Harpers Magazine in a piece titled 'An army of
one's own - in Africa, nations hire a corporation to
wage war' (Rubio 1997). The author writes about a
corporation that provides clandestine warfare,
combat air patrol, battle handling and sniper
training. The company - Executive Outcomes - in
exchange for $15 million and a share of Sierra
Leone's diamond mines was able to do what no one
else had been able to do: 'No one - not the United
Nations, not the Organisation of African Unity, not
the international-conflict-resolution experts who
filled up the abandoned tourist hotels in Freetown,
Sierra Leone's capital - was able to bring the
fighting under control' (ibid: 45). According to
Ruhm, Executive Outcomes was to 'combat and
destroy the "terrorist enemies of the state"; to
restore internal security; and to help build and
maintain an economic climate where new
investment could be attracted and allowed ro
flourish' (ibid), Sierra Leone, long viewed as a
disaster, became for a short while a West African
'success', so much so that the mercenaries became
respected heroes because they had replaced
banditry with security Such occurrences are more
than a shift in the nature of war, they indicate a shift
in the nature of law. As in the premodern period,
military and economic functions will be reunited by
means of the booming security business, which in
the case of Sierra Leone and other African countries
is taking over the state, or at least recolonising, with
private armies clearing the way for business firms -
the 'privatisation of violence'.
Ruhm ends her story by noting that Executive
Outcomes is accountable to no nation and no legal
body The marketplace is the law. This is the
underside of conflict management in Africa and
elsewhere. It is what eventually happens when we
abandon the hope for a rule of law in exchange for
international negotiation based on efficiency or feel-
good principles of psychology It is what happens
when the frame is narrow.
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ADR specialists have defined their domain in too
limited a frame. They need to enlarge the scope.
And when they do they will also realise that it is
not possible to have a universal paradigm for
conflict management. One of the cleverest propag-
anda concepts invented after colonialism, whether
consciously or not, was the term 'post-colonial'. It
is, as with 'tradition', a concept up for grabs.
When we say traditional was followed by colonial
and that was followed by post-colonial, it appears
as if discontinuities prevailed over continuities.
Yet, if we look at the factors presently destabilising
the world at an accelerated rate, we find many of
the same economic interests that fuelled the
colonial regimes still in the lead. This article is not
the place to review the sources of destabilisations,
yet specialists in dispute resolution would be able
to develop more realistic frames for specific
disputes or conflicts if they understood the
message of increasing numbers of businessmen
who are speaking about and writing about
globalisation and desrabilisation by means of such
activities as global free trade, intensive agriculture,
energy policies, management's bottom line or
market-place ideology (Karten 1996; Goldsmith
1994; Estes 1996; Soros 1997).
4 The Power of Ideology
The process whereby ideologies that are forces of
change are shaped in modern nation states goes
beyond the law to include the links between law,
business, and community constituencies. However,
the principal vehicle for the transmission of
ideological forces has been and continues to be by
means of law state or international law in the
contemporary period, for good or for bad.
Historian Jerold Auerbach (1983) details this
progression for the United States as part of the
transformation of American society dating at least
from the end of the last century He notes that:
'Amid the social dislocations that accompanied the
rapid concentration of wealth and power in the age
of industrial expansion, the full force of law was
asserted to protect the new social order' (Auerbach
1983:139-40). Auerbach continues to note that
competing pockets of authority originating in
tribalism, religion, ethnicity and class were stripped
of dispute settlement processes that had contrib-
uted to internal cohesion, but that now competed
with the legal supremacy of the state. He explains
the current enthusiasm for delegalisation as an
effort to deal with the legitimacy dilemma: the law
is designed to protect the Haves as well as the Have-
Nots. The problem is that the ideal of equal justice
is incompatible with the social realities of unequal
power so that, as 1 have said elsewhere, disputing
without the force of law is doomed to failure (Nader
1979).
Other scholars during the early 1980s iterated the
same line of criticism and elaborated the problems
with ADR (Abel 1982; Harrington 1985; Hofrichter
1987). Nevertheless ADR marched on to become
institutionalised and internationalised, despite
continued critiques that more recently stress the
irreconcilablity between problem-solving mediation
and transformative mediation (Milrier 1996; Bush
and Baruch 1996). Scholars have by now
documented the ills of problem-solving alternatives
that do not address social justice issues, since the
core feature of most alternative processes is that
they address and resolve individual cases on
individuated criteria. Some, like Sally Merry
(1993), unselfconsciously argue that 'popular
justice introduces a new ideology of conflict
resolution based on nonviolence and opposition to
the violence of law' (Merry and Mimer 1993:62).
Others think that one can tinker with present
alternatives to make them more responsive actors in
issues of social transformation.
While scholars meditate on the possibilities of
popular justice, the real consequences of ADR
policies are harsh. The most hard-hitting critique of
American ADR is that of the late Trina Grillo
(1991), a law professor and mediator, who
understood better than most the ideological nature
of ADR mediation in family cases, and the ADR
process dangers for women. Grillo points revolve
around the notions that mandatory mediation
abridges freedom because it is often outside the law,
eliminates choice of procedure, removes equal
protection before an adversary law and is generally
hidden from view In spite of growing awareness of
its consequences, ADR ideology is intact and
diffusing worldwide.
There is more to American ADR ideology than the
obvious congruencies between trade ideology and
harmony ideology (i.e. harmonising), or even the
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missionising and pacification of indigenous
peoples. There is in American culture such a
yearning for an idealised equality that the very
ideology of equality creates a denial of unequal
power. This in itself inspires the 'soldiers' of
movements like ADR, those that make it happen:
the experts, the practitioners, even the scholars who
feed the narrative. But try to imagine what happens
when the 'soldiers' of a movement like ADR go
abroad with such ideological baggage to deal with
different sets of legal ideologies amongst different
people with different histories.
5 Discussion
To move forward we need epistemological models
that allow us to understand the interaction of law,
power, and tradition (Hobsbawn and Ranger 1992),
'true' or invented, and accompanying ideologies
that characterise social conflict. No matter how
autonomous we may wish the dispute resolution
process to be, it is not autonomous. It is completely
intermingled with political and economic issues.
When policies are being engineered from Western
or Westernised ideas, the impact of Western notions
of autonomous systems and the importance of
individual (rather than that of collective-centred
perspectives) cannot be forgotten.
Clearly any ADR scheme needs careful study of the
social conditions in which it may operate. The
rhetoric of harmony law models is attractive. But
the idea that in a conciliatory model people do not
fight but rather harmoniously agree about a
common solution is fiction. So also is the belief that
such a harmony model exists ïn 'primitive' and
idyllic societies. Once again we need to understand
the real dynamic of power that is at play
In another context, Nader and Shugart (1980)
concluded that practitioners of dispute manage-
ment need to think in terms of a complaint chain,
one that moves from negotiation to mediation, to
arbitration and adjudication, in a chain of referrals
in which the least powerful gain as they move up
the chain, thus giving incentive for parties to move
towards an outcome. 'Disputing without the force
of law' (Nader 1979) will not work unless the force
of law is available as a last resort. lt is not possible
to divorce law and power.
ADR devices have been around long enough (at
least twenty-five years) to merit a thorough
evaluation of their efficacy and consequences. ADR,
as Chief Justice Burger noted, is a legal revolution,
one with many ramifications. Yet, a good portion of
the attempt at dialogue with the ADR 'legal
revolutionaries' has remained unanswered, ignored,
or dealt with by means of unscholarly think-tank
reports. It is long past time for a real dialogue by
serious scholars willing to examine evidence for or
against plentiful assertions of success. Such
scholarship might eventually lead us in the
direction of the extended case method pioneered by
Elizabeth Colson in 1953 for African ethnography,
or in the direction of excellent extended case
stories, such as the recent work of Jonathan Harr
(1995) who documented the story of water and the
Woburn leukaemia cluster. Both models are
empirical. The result is methodologically similar; in
both instances one finds a wide-angled lens, a
broadening of scope and comprehensive under-
standings of conflict.
The underside of conflict management includes
more than a study of techniques of conflict
resolution. It includes nationalism and its
consequences and its actors - politicians,
businessmen, arms dealers, mercenaries, ethnics
and above all victims. We know that the causes of
war and conflict are not necessarily endemic. An
integrated perspective on policy directions for
conflict management in the face of more grounded
contexts will undoubtedly favour constraint over
consensus, and law over lawlessness.
Notes
For an excellent discussion of arms dealing and the
African continent see Lethal Commerce: The Global
Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, edited by
Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare, and Laura Reed,
1996. As the authors note, President Mandela of
South Africa is well aware of the relation between the
global flow of arms and the causes of ethnic conflict
and repression. His position on banning weapons
sales to countries engaged in civil conflict, however, is
opposed by his regimeb practical commitment to
South Africa arms industry, by the socio-economic
pressures of post-Apartheid reform.
The dispute resolution style that Laurel Rose describes
for Africa greatly resembles practices in pre-industrial
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